their implications is a must for any litigant or counsel faced with or considering asserting a charge of inequitable conduct. This Article discusses these significant recent inequitable conduct-related developments and their combined impact on litigating the defense. Part I of this Article reviews the new judicial standards for pleading and proving inequitable conduct, illustrates their application in recent Federal Circuit and district court decisions, and summarizes lessons for litigators from recent cases. Part II discusses the legislature's recent contribution to the inequitable conduct landscape: the supplemental examination proceeding created by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). 10 Part III considers the options, post-Therasense and the AIA, for patent owners faced with a potential inequitable conduct challenge. Following Part III is a conclusion of the discussion.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.
New Substantive Standards
Citing concerns regarding the frequency with which inequitable conduct was being alleged in patent cases, and the consequences of those allegations for the courts, patent prosecutors, and the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), the en banc Federal Circuit in Therasense announced stricter standards for proving the defense of inequitable conduct.
11 After Therasense, a challenger must still "prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the [USPTO]"
12 by clear and convincing evidence. 13 However, a new, narrower definition of materiality now governs inequitable conduct determinations post-Therasense. The general rule is that the misrepresented or omitted information must be "but-for material"-the challenger must prove that "the [USPTO] would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed" or correct information. 14 The court made an exception to this requirement for "cases of affirmative 10 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
11 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290-93 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 12 Id. at 1287. The court had previously announced the "specific intent to deceive" standard in Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . 13 Id. at 1287. 14 Id. at 1291. In making such a determination, a court is to "apply the preponderance of the evidence standard and give claims their broadest reasonable construction," in accordance with USPTO practice. Id. at 1291-92 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § § 706 , 2111 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010)). egregious misconduct." 15 Specifically, " [w] hen the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material." 16 Regarding intent, " [a] finding that [a] misrepresentation or omission amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a 'should have known' standard does not satisfy th[e] intent requirement." 17 The Therasense majority gave an example:
"In a case involving nondisclosure of information, clear and convincing evidence must show that the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference." In other words, the accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it. 18 The third significant holding of Therasense concerned the "'sliding scale,' where a weak showing of intent [could] be found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice versa." 19 The majority declared that "[i]ntent and materiality are separate requirements." 20 It instructed the district courts not to use a "sliding scale," and specifically directed that "a district court may not infer intent solely from materiality." 21 Again, giving an example, the court stated that " [p] roving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the [USPTO] does not prove specific intent to deceive." 22 The court acknowledged that "a district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence." 23 But it reiterated that such an inference should be drawn only if it is "the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence."
24 "Hence, when there are multiple reasonable inferences that may be drawn, intent to deceive cannot be found." 25 15 Id. at 1292. 16 Id. 17 Id. at 1290. 18 Id. (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. (citing Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 23 Id. at 1290. 24 Id. 25 Id. at 1290-91.
The New Standards in Operation a. Materiality After Therasense
The Federal Circuit had occasion to apply the new Therasense standards shortly after they were announced. On June 27, 2011, in American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 26 the court applied the "but-for materiality" standard to distinguish between prior art information that had been found to anticipate the claims at issue-inherently a finding that the USPTO would not have issued those claims 27 -and other information as to which no such specific finding had been made. 28 As to the latter information, the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's findings of materiality and remanded for consideration of the issue under the standard set forth in the interim in Therasense. 29 American Calcar illustrates how the Federal Circuit has upheld materiality findings where the undisclosed prior art was found to invalidate the claims at issue. 30 In the two years since the Federal Circuit decided Therasense, the court has had limited opportunity to apply the Therasense materiality standards to information other than undisclosed prior art. A fulsome understanding of the new boundaries of material information must await the development of the case law, but the court has begun to lay down some markers. For example, the court considered an applicant's failure to update a Petition to Make Special in Powell 26 651 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 27 A district court evaluates anticipation and obviousness under a "clear and convincing" standard of proof. See, e.g., ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 700 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) ) ("Anticipation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."); In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 517-18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) ("The district court applied the correct standard, that the challenger must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention at the time the invention was made."). Accordingly, a district court's finding of invalidity reflects a level of proof beyond what would be required to establish that the USPTO would not have issued the claims at issue applying its "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 28 See Am. Calcar, 651 F.3d at 1335. 29 Id. 30 See id. Compare Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court's finding of materiality, having affirmed the district court's finding that the withheld references rendered obvious the claims at issue), with August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the accused infringer's inequitable conduct counterclaim where the undisclosed product, even if on sale prior art, "would not render the asserted claims obvious in view of the other cited prior art").
v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
31 There, the applicant had failed to alert the USPTO that he was no longer under an obligation to manufacture, as he had asserted in his previously-filed petition. 32 According to the court, the applicant's failure-toupdate "obviously fails the but-for materiality standard and is not the type of unequivocal act, 'such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit,' that would rise to the level of 'affirmative egregious misconduct. '" 33 The Federal Circuit also applied the Therasense materiality standard in Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc.
34 Without specifically applying the "but-for" standard, the court held that the existence of litigation regarding a parent patent was not material to the prosecution of a continuation where, during the pendency of the continuation, the litigation (a declaratory judgment action relating only to non-infringement) did not involve allegations of invalidity or unenforceability.
35
The court, however, declined to decide whether a false declaration of small entity status qualifies as "an unmistakably false affidavit" for purposes of the Therasense "affirmative egregious misconduct" exception to the "but-for materiality" requirement. 36 Acknowledging that "on its face, it appears that a false small entity declaration would fall within the definition of an 'unmistakably false affidavit,' particularly since a party that claims entitlement to small entity status does so in a sworn written declaration," the court held that it "need not decide that question," because "there was no evidence that anyone involved in the patent prosecution knew that a patent license had been granted to a large entity and deliberately withheld that information in order to pay small entity fees." 37 This case illustrates how the Federal Circuit, in particular, may increasingly rely on insufficient record evidence of deceptive intent to decide appeals relating to inequitable conduct. 38 Thus, the intent prong of the analysis (discussed below) may come to dominate the inequitable conduct inquiry postTherasense, and the development of the law concerning the new materiality standards may proceed at a slower pace. In contrast, the less exacting materiality standards in force prior to Therasense led to an expanding list of potentially material information.
b. Deceptive Intent After Therasense
The Federal Circuit has thus far rigorously enforced its "most reasonable inference" requirement for evidence of deceptive intent. 42 the court affirmed "that unenforceability based on inequitable conduct was not established," despite affirming the district court's determination that the undisclosed references at issue were material, because "deceptive intent was not the single most reasonable inference" based on the evidence. 43 Further, in accordance with its Therasense directive regarding the need to assess evidence of deceptive intent "independent of its analysis of materiality," 44 the court has also vacated or reversed (pre-Therasense) findings of intent that were predicated significantly on findings of materiality. For example, in 1st Media, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 45 the court reversed a judgment of unenforceability without evaluating but-for materiality where the evidence supported only that the inventor and his lawyer "(1) knew of the references, (2) may have known they were material . . . , and (3) did not inform the [USPTO] of them" and thus failed to establish that they "'made a deliberate decision to withhold [them] . ' 49 The Federal Circuit pointed to the district court's specific findings that the witness's explanations for withholding the references at issue lacked credibility, and "other evidence," such as the witness's knowledge of the relevant prior art, his selective citation of information to the USPTO, and inconsistencies between the witness's testimony and corporate documents regarding relevant experiments. 50 This case shows that the exacting post-Therasense intent standard can be met, with appropriate evidence and detailed, specific judicial findings.
B. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
New Pleading Standards
Exergen was aimed at curbing inequitable conduct allegations at their source-the pleadings. In this 2009 panel decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision denying an infringement defendant's motion to amend its answer to allege inequitable conduct on the ground that the allegations of the amendment were insufficiently particular under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 51 The court held that "simply aver[ring] the substantive elements of inequitable conduct, without setting forth the particularized factual bases for the allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b)." 52 Standing alone, this holding is not particularly remarkable, given that in several cases preceding Exergen the Federal Circuit had expressly enforced a requirement for specificity in inequitable conduct pleadings. 53 54 Applying this standard, the court held that a recitation that "Exergen, its agent and/or attorneys" failed to identify the "who," and the pleading inadequately set forth the "'what' and 'where' of the material omissions" by "fail[ing] to identify which claims, and which limitations in those claims, the withheld references are relevant to, and where in those references the material information is found." 55 It similarly held that generally stating that the withheld references "are 'material' and 'not cumulative to the information already of record'" fails to "explain both 'why' the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and 'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims." 56 The court indicated that "identify[ing] the particular claim limitations, or combination of claim limitations, that are supposedly absent from the information of record" would be necessary in this regard. 57 As to intent, the Federal Circuit held that:
although "knowledge" and "intent" may be averred generally, a pleading of inequitable conduct under [Fed. R. Civ. Proc.] Rule 9(b) must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the [USPTO].
58
Applying this standard, the court held that the defendant's allegations regarding the patentee's deceptive intent, in failing to disclose the references at issue, were insufficient. 59 Furthermore, the court held that merely alleging awareness of a reference does not allege knowledge of the supposedly material information contained in the reference. 60 Moreover, the court also stated that an allegation "that an applicant disclosed a reference during prosecution of one application, Apotex alleges that "but for" material omissions and misrepresentations made by "Senju [Pharma], Kyorin, the inventors, and/or those acting on their behalf" with an intent to deceive the [USPTO], the reexamined claims of the '045 patent would not have issued. Specifically, the pleadings allege that the following materials were withheld: (1) portions of the trial record and expert reports from the prior litigation disclosing that Kyorin's researchers had been the first to make and test gatifloxacin ophthalmic formulations covered by the '045 patent claims; (2) evidence showing that the formulations as claimed by the '045 patent did not exhibit unexpected results; and (3) deposition testimony of Senju's expert from the prior litigation allegedly conceding the obviousness of preparing aqueous liquid compositions containing 0.3 w/v% gaitfloxacin and 0.01 w/v% of disodium edetate, based on the well-known use of disodium edetate to prevent coloration. 63 The court compared these allegations against the required "who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the [USPTO] ." 64 The court held that the "pleadings at issue sufficiently plead the 'how' . . . and 'where' standards" (by alleging that the patentee mislead the USPTO regarding "evidence of obviousness, secondary considerations, and the scope of the patent's written description").
court can reasonably infer, given the volume of materials from the prior litigation that was submitted during reexamination, that the materials that were withheld were done so with knowledge and intent to deceive the [ According to the Mitsubishi court, the problem was the use of the "and/or" conjunction:
The double "and/or" conjunction is too often used by lawyers trying to cover all bases. Its use often has unintended consequences. Through the "and" part of the conjunction, GE has managed to lump the named inventors, attorneys, and agents together under the title "Applicants," and through the "or" portion GE has disjoined them; the result is that GE has failed to specifically identify who is guilty of misconduct . . . . Moreover, a strict application of the "or" alternative of the double conjunction in this case results in an allegation that either the named inventors or some other individual or individuals engaged in deceptive conduct. The other individual or individuals, who remain unnamed, are perhaps the only ones to have engaged in the suspect behavior. Under this construction, GE certainly cannot be said to have made an allegation against a particular person.
79
This type of searching analysis is typical of district court decisions regarding the sufficiency of inequitable conduct allegations post-Exergen. 80 The district court's decision in Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc.
81 is particularly illuminating, as the court carefully distinguished among various allegations regarding the persons alleged to have engaged in inequitable conduct. The defendants' pleading identified the following persons who allegedly "knowingly failed to disclose material information to the [USPTO]":
82
• Oracle International; • Kim Rejndrup, the '221 patent inventor; • "Each attorney or agent who prepared or prosecuted the application"; • "Every other person who was substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application that became the '221 patent and who was associated with the inventor, with the assignee, or with anyone to whom there was an obligation to assign the application"; • "Every individual having a duty of disclosure under 37 C.F.R. According to the court:
All but one of these categories are quite general and will not suffice on their own under Exergen . . . . DrugLogic has adequately pled the "who" of the alleged material omission with respect to Mr. Rejndrup, but not with respect to any other person. In any amended complaint, DrugLogic may only name specific, identified individuals, including Mr. Rejndrup.
84
The Oracle decision clearly illustrates a significant Exergen impact: pleadings alleging inequitable conduct will generally be required to "name names." 'where' of the material omission." 87 Obviously, in undisclosed-reference-type situations, specific identification (e.g., by page and/or line numbers) to the precise location of the allegedly material information in the reference and a corresponding identification of the claim limitation(s) allegedly undermined by the undisclosed reference should suffice. 88 However, what should matter is that the pleading somehow identifies the specific information that was (allegedly) withheld or misrepresented and connect it to the claim coverage or other benefit the patent owner obtained as a result.
The recent decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC 89 illustrates this pragmatic application of the "what" and "where" requirements of Exergen. The challenger, CoStar, identified particular references that were omitted from a declaration the patent owner had submitted in response to a USPTO request (during prosecution) that the patent owner identify the most relevant among hundreds of disclosed references. 90 It alleged "that the omitted references disclose the use of the Internet or 'internet-like networking systems generally' to communicate between a user and a remote database from which the user seeks information."
91 It further alleged "that the references are relevant 'to all the asserted claims of the '335 Patent, as claim 1, the only independent claim, pertains to 'advertising over the Internet', and all other claims of the '335 Patent are dependent on claim 1. '" 92 In response to the patent owner's Exergen-based challenge, the court held that the latter allegation "adequately identifies the claims the withheld references are relevant to."
93 Regarding "where in the references the relevant information is found," the court acknowledged that the pleading at issue did "not identify page 87 Id. at 1329. 88 The defendant's use of a claim chart to illustrate the relevance of an allegedly withheld reference to particular claims of the patent at issue was cited as satisfying the "where" requirement in BASF Catalysts LLC v Although a party alleging inequitable conduct would be well-advised to include page numbers, doing so is not absolutely necessary to meet Exergen's requirements if the pleading adequately describes the relevant information. Indeed, if the relevant information is adequately described, filling in the page and line numbers is merely an academic, redundant exercise. This court will not require such technical pleading . . . . In the context of the patents-in-suit, CoStar's descriptions plainly indicate that the relevant information in the withheld references is how to use the Internet to communicate between a user and a remote database from which the user seeks information.
96
A comparatively more strict interpretation of the "what" and "where" requirements in the context of allegedly withheld material prior art is illustrated by the Oracle decision. The inequitable conduct allegations at issue concerned the alleged nondisclosure of specified "hierarchical relational medical thesaurus dictionaries" during the prosecution of the asserted patent. 97 The patent owner summarized the invention as follows:
The presently claimed system is operable to store and classify a plurality of terms, such as clinical or scientific terms according to a hierarchy of relations. The relations define and organize the terms according to more general and more specific terms. In other words, the relations may indicate which terms may be subclasses [,] superclasses [,] or synonyms of other terms. Such organization is beneficial in scientific or medical studies where large quantities of data are processed and consistency among term usage may not be deterministic. 98 According to the challenger, "this statement also describes already-existing hierarchical relational medical thesaurus dictionaries such as" those alleged to have been withheld, and a subsequent claim amendment further limiting the relevant thesauruses to those "of clinical terms used in conjunction with a clinical study" also did not distinguish or diminish the relevance of the allegedly withheld prior art. 99 The level of specificity in these allegations appears on par 94 Id. 106 or out in the marketplace. 107 Whatever the relevant allegedly undisclosed or misrepresented information, and wherever it is found or occurred, a challenger seeking to plead inequitable conduct after Exergen is well-advised to be as specific as possible in setting forth facts corresponding to the "what" and "where" of the asserted improper conduct.
c. Pleading the "When" and "How"/"Why" "When" the alleged inequitable conduct occurred depends on the nature of the alleged misconduct. For example, where the conduct at issue involves undisclosed information, some courts have found it sufficient for the challenger to allege that the misconduct occurred "during prosecution."
108 Others have not. 109 However, allegations that the nondisclosure occurred during the pendency of the prosecution, with specific references to the filing dates of disclosure statements that did not include the allegedly withheld information, have been held sufficient. For example, according to the court in BASF Catalysts LLC v. Aristo Inc.:
110
[T]he "when" component was identified by Aristo as occurring during the pending '210 patent application, from June 21, 1996 through February 2, 1999, and particularly in the disclosure statements filed by BASF on August 1, 1996, and February 3, 1998. Alleging the exact dates and 106 See, e.g., Civix-DDI, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (stating that regarding an alleged failure to disclose relevant litigation, the "where" requirement was met with allegations that the conduct at issue occurred in the "District Court in Colorado and at the [USPTO]"). 107 See DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 85, at 11 ("When the alleged inequitable conduct is based on a failure to disclose relevant activities, such as sales, offers for sale, or litigation, specific identification of the location of the activity is necessary."). 108 Id. (collecting cases holding "during prosecution"-style allegations sufficient). 109 See, e.g., Target 
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111
Other types of inequitable conduct defenses (or counterclaims) may necessitate allegations regarding when particular events occurred (for example, pre-critical date sales or uses), 112 or when specified persons became aware of particular information.
113
The "how" aspect of the Exergen standard has been called " [t] he most difficult step in the Exergen analysis[, requiring] the causal link between the activity alleged and the granting of the patents in suit." 114 The Federal Circuit held that the pleading at issue in Exergen failed the "how" inquiry because although it "state [d] generally that the withheld references are 'material' and 'not cumulative to the information already of record,'" it did "not identify the particular claim limitations, or combination of claim limitations, that are supposedly absent from the information of record."
115 According to the court, "[s]uch allegations are necessary to explain both 'why' the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and 'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims."
116
The Federal Circuit's language in this regard has spawned some disagreement among the district courts as to whether there is a "why" 118 described the debate (and its and another court's resolution) as follows:
For a "withholding" claim, the party alleging inequitable conduct must explain "'why' the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and 'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims." In Lincoln National Life v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company, the district court noted that "a plain reading of the Exergen opinion strongly suggests there is no independent 'why' requirement . . . . Rather, the 'how' and 'why' factors . . . both refer to the broader requirement of materiality." The Northern District of Indiana arrived at this conclusion for several reasons. First, the court noted that the 1990 ].DiLeo made no mention of an independent "why" requirement, or a "why" requirement at all. Second, as observed in Lincoln National Life, the Exergen court itself did not mention a "why" requirement when it first adopted the Seventh Circuit's standard. Rather, Exergen held "that in pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the [USPTO]." Nor did it later when the Exergen court elaborated the standard for a second time. The "why" was elevated to the status of a pleading requirement based on the parentless "scare quotes" escorting the word later in the Exergen opinion.
This court agrees with the reasons elaborated by the Northern District of Indiana, and adds one of its own. The so-called "why" requirement, as the Exergen court has spelled it out, requires the court to examine both the withheld information in order to determine its actual materiality, and the information actually presented to the [USPTO] to determine whether the withheld information is cumulative. This is not an appropriate examination to conduct at the pleading stage.
119
In holding that there is no separate "why" requirement, the Lincoln National court concluded that "the 'how' and 'why' factors described by the Federal Circuit both refer to the broader requirement of materiality. specifically, "the party seeking leave to amend must show how the patent examiner would have used the withheld reference in evaluating the patent application; that is to say, why the withheld information is material and not cumulative to the information already disclosed."
121
Another debate concerning the "how" factor relates to whether an inequitable conduct challenger must expressly (and separately) allege that the (undisclosed or allegedly misrepresented) information at issue was not cumulative. 122 As noted above, the Federal Circuit held that the pleading at issue in Exergen failed the "how" inquiry because although it "state [d] generally that the withheld references are 'material' and 'not cumulative to the information already of record,'" it did "not identify the particular claim limitations, or combination of claim limitations, that are supposedly absent from the information of record." 123 The court continued: "[s]uch allegations are necessary to explain both 'why' the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and 'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims."
124 It is this language in Exergen that has given rise to the debate regarding whether a pleader must expressly allege that the allegedly withheld or misrepresented information at issue was not cumulative of the other information before the USPTO examiner. 125 As the district court in Aerocrine AB v. Apieron Inc.
126 recognized, however, the problem in Exergen was not a failure to expressly alleged noncumulativeness, but rather the bald (unexplained) allegation to that effect. 127 Thus, the Aerocrine court found allegations identifying particular claim limitations that were asserted to be missing from the information of record before the USPTO, and "explaining that a reasonable examiner would have found this art to be material to at least [specified claims], because it represents the prior invention, anticipates, and/or renders obvious at least those claims" sufficient to "explain the 'why' and 'how.'" 128 The court noted, however, the existence of "disagreement in the reported case law on this point."
129
That disagreement among the district courts as to whether Exergen treats non-cumulativeness as an aspect of the defense that must be pled in addition to (sufficient allegations of) materiality continues. Some courts, for example, have 121 To fully plead that a specific person omitted material information, the Defendants' pleading must also explain both "why" the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and 'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims."
Id
Information that is withheld from the USPTO is but-for material only when "the [USPTO] would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art." Defendants' counterclaim alleges that " In allegation D, Defendants allege that examiners relied on five of the omitted references in prior related patent applications to make rejections of substantially similar claims to those presented in the '488 application. Defendants also specify the claims of the '488 application to which each omitted reference is relevant. With respect to the five references, the clear implication is that if the references had been before the examiner on the '488 application, the substantially similar claims would have been rejected. That those claims were not rejected implies that no other information before the examiner compelled rejection, and thus that the five omitted references are not cumulative. Id. at *6 (footnote omitted). screen protectors and the products embodying the '942 Patent, the Court finds that Defendants have adequately pleaded that the patent examiner might not have allowed the unspecified claims if he/she had been aware of these undisclosed products.
The same cannot be said for Defendants' allegations that the two products were not cumulative of the information already disclosed during prosecution. "It is well-established . . . that information is not material if it is cumulative of other information already disclosed to the [USPTO] ." Accordingly, to satisfy the "why" component, Defendants' counterclaim must also plead with particularity that the withheld information is not cumulative of the information actually disclosed during prosecution. Such facts are absent from Defendants' counterclaim. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants' counterclaim fails to plead with particularity "why" the withheld information is material and not cumulative.
133
Clearly, until the Federal Circuit resolves these differing interpretations of the "how" requirement, a pleader would be well-advised to plead facts specifically (and perhaps separately) addressing "why" the information at issue was material, "why" it was non-cumulative, and "'how' an examiner would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims." As discussed above, in Exergen, the Federal Circuit held that "knowledge" and "intent" may be stated generally, but a pleading of inequitable conduct "must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the [USPTO] ." 135 The district court in the Lincoln National case 136 applied this sufficient-facts-to-support-a-reasonable-inference-of-knowledge-and-specificintent-to-deceive standard to an allegation of inequitable conduct based on an allegedly intentionally withheld reference.
137
[The defendant] has alleged that the named inventors knew of their duty to disclose relevant information and knew of the features of the withheld 133 Id. at *7-8 (citations omitted). The Aevoe Corp. court also cited several other cases it regarded as supporting the notion of a separate requirement for allegations of noncumulativeness. See id. at *8. 134 whether, taking all of the alleged facts as true, the Court can draw the "reasonable inference" that a party is liable for the claimed misconduct, such that the claim is "plausible." After all, courts "do not inquire whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail when considering a motion to dismiss, only whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his or her claims." Moreover, at the pleading stage, a court does not (and cannot) review "all of the circumstances" at play in a case, as the Therasense "single most reasonable inference" inquiry requires. Instead, a court assessing the sufficiency of a pleading looks only to a narrow category of materials (the pleading and any attached exhibits) provided only by one side (the party or parties asserting the inequitable conduct claim). [Vol. 13
Second, in Exergen, the Federal Circuit appeared to specifically indicate that the "single most reasonable inference" analysis was a separate inquiry from that used to examine whether inequitable conduct is well-pled. After holding that a party must plead facts from which a court can "reasonably infer" that material information was misrepresented or withheld with the specific intent to deceive the , the accused infringer must allege facts from which it is plausible that the applicant had an intent to deceive," and need not demonstrate that deceptive intent is "the most reasonable inference"). The issue of whether Therasense augmented the pleading requirements announced in Exergen awaits definitive resolution by the Federal Circuit. 148 Clearly, however, a requirement that patent challengers allege facts supporting deceptive intent as the most reasonable inference (as opposed to a plausible inference) would be difficult to satisfy in many cases at the pleading stage.
The recent decision of the district court in Parkervision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.
149 dismissing an inequitable conduct allegation based on alleged "burying" of the assigned USPTO examiner "'with hundreds of references so as to distract his attention from highly relevant references'" illustrates how the combination of Exergen and Therasense may impact pleading standards.
150
Noting that Exergen requires "'sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer'" that the patentee "'withheld or misrepresented [the] information with a specific intent to deceive the [USPTO],'" the district court held that "an equally if not more reasonable inference [to be drawn from the allegation that the patentee inundated the examiner] is that [the patentee] aimed to insulate itself from such claims by over-disclosing references."
151 Parkervision thus suggests that where a court can reasonably infer that deceptive intent is not the single most reasonable inference to be drawn from the alleged facts, dismissal of the subject allegations may be appropriate.
C. Lessons from Therasense and Exergen
To summarize, Therasense, Exergen, and the decisions applying them thus far suggest the following lessons for litigants and counsel:
 Withheld information that is found to anticipate or render obvious claims under a "clear and convincing evidence" standard necessarily satisfies the Therasense "but-for materiality" standard.  Even where the USPTO requires disclosure of information, that information may not be regarded as material under Therasense.  As compared with the pre-Therasense period, the development of Federal Circuit law relating materiality may be delayed to the extent the court declines to rule on materiality in cases where the deceptive intent standard is clearly not satisfied. 148 The appellate briefs in Delano Farms were filed in early 2011 before Therasense was decided, and, accordingly, did not raise the issue of whether Therasense raised the bar for pleading deceptive intent beyond what Exergen requires.
149 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2013). 150 See id. at 1318. 151 Id. ("Because specific intent to deceive is not the only or single most reasonable inference to be drawn from the disclosure of voluminous references to the [USPTO], Qualcomm's pleading of the 'burying' theory fails as a matter of law.").

The Federal Circuit will closely scrutinize district court rulings and records regarding evidence of deceptive intent, which can be expected to influence district courts, in turn, to carefully consider such evidence. In particular, challengers will need to marshal evidence of a deliberate decision to deceive, or at least show that deceptive intent is the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.  Deceptive intent findings that are based significantly on the materiality of the withheld or misrepresented information will be vulnerable on appeal.  Allegations that inequitable conduct was committed by entities, "persons involved in the prosecution," or "inventors and/or attorneys" are unlikely to be held sufficient. To satisfy Exergen's "who" requirement, inequitable conduct pleadings must expressly (or effectively) "name names."  There is some disagreement among the district courts regarding inequitable conduct pleading requirements, including whether there is a "why" requirement distinct from the "how" requirement, whether an inequitable conduct challenger must expressly allege that the undisclosed or allegedly misrepresented information was not cumulative to other information before the examiner, and the impact the Federal Circuit's substantive "single most reasonable inference" standard on the pleading of deceptive intent.  The precise interplay between Therasense and Exergen on pleading allegations relating to deceptive intent is unresolved.
II. THE LEGISLATURE'S CONTRIBUTION: SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION
The AIA created a new USPTO proceeding designated as a "supplemental examination." 152 The purpose is "to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent" that is the subject of the request. 153 The USPTO is charged with evaluating the information presented in the request under the familiar reexamination standard: "whether [it] raises a substantial new question of patentability,"
154 and it will have three months to make that determination. 155 Only the patent owner can request a supplemental examination.
156
According to the new law, the consequence of a USPTO determination that any of the information in the request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new question of patentability is a reexamination proceeding 157 that differs from the usual ex parte reexamination in two principal respects. First, the patent owner (who filed the request for supplemental examination in the first place) is barred from submitting a statement. 158 Second, and significantly, the restriction limiting reexamination to consideration of "patents and printed publications" 159 does not apply, 160 and "information" is not otherwise limited or defined in the legislation. 161 Accordingly, a patent owner can use supplemental examination not only to bring to the attention of the USPTO prior art patents and printed publications, but also non-print prior art (such as pre-critical date sales and public uses) and non-prior art information of the kind the Federal Circuit had held to be material for purposes of the inequitable conduct defense, prior to Therasense. Such non-prior art information includes:
 unpublished notes taken by a non-inventor, co-employee at a poster presentation,
162
 a non-prior art article relevant to whether the claims at issue were enabled,
163
 a third-party's patent application (in the inventor's possession) and information regarding the third-party's model of his own invention (which the inventor had seen), 164  "intentional falsehoods, misrepresentations, and nondisclosures" relating to inventorship,
165
 a false statement in a Petition to Make Special, 166 and  unjustified claims to small entity status.
167
Some of the non-prior art information listed above (without more) clearly will not raise a "substantial new question of patentability," 168 168 "The presence or absence of a 'substantial new question of patentability' determines whether or not reexamination is ordered." Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2242 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). According to the USPTO's rules for implementing supplemental examination, "[t]he decision as to whether the information submitted in a request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new question of patentability is identical to the decision as to whether the information submitted in a request for ex parte reexamination raises a substantial new question of patentability, except that the information submitted in a request for supplemental examination is not limited to patents and publications and may be directed to issues of patentability in addition to those permitted in ex parte reexamination, such as issues under 35 U.S.C. 101 and 112." Changes To Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and to Review Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 48,831 (Aug. 14, 2012). In ex parte reexamination, "[a] prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable." Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2242. Accordingly, in supplemental examination, information will raise a substantial new question of patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the information important in deciding whether or not a claim is patentable. will not satisfy the Federal Circuit's new "but-for" materiality standard. 169 However, at least where there is doubt about how a court might regard information-prior art or otherwise-that was (or was arguably) not considered (or inadequately considered) by the USPTO during original (or a prior) prosecution, a patent owner could elect to pursue supplemental examination. New § 257(c) of the Patent Act sets forth the preemptive protection a patent owner can obtain via supplemental examination:
Litigating Inequitable Conduct After
A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent. The making of a request under subsection (a), or the absence thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.
170
This is the key provision in the supplemental examination portion of the AIA. Unless certain exceptions relating to timing apply, 171 the legislation strips the courts of the power to hold patents unenforceable for inequitable conduct in cases where the patentee has previously secured, via supplemental examination, USPTO consideration of the information the patent challenger alleges was withheld or misrepresented. 171 The injunction against a determination of unenforceability will not operate if either of two statutory exceptions applies. These exceptions relate to timing, and will be triggered by specified events. First, a patent owner contemplating an enforcement action (either in the district courts or in the International Trade Commission) and seeking to head off an anticipated inequitable conduct charge based on particular information will only obtain the benefit of the § 257(c)(1) protection if the USPTO has concluded its supplemental examination of that information (at the patent owner's request) and any resulting reexamination before the patent owner files its enforcement action. See id. § 257(c)(2)(B). The second exception applies when the patent challenger (as opposed to the patent owner) makes the first move, e.g., by filing a declaratory judgment action or answer to complaint containing particularized allegations of inequitable conduct, or by sending the patent owner a Paragraph IV letter, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV) (2006), before the patent owner files a supplemental examination request. See 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A). In such a case, supplemental examination will not preclude litigation of the inequitable conduct defense at issue. These two exceptions operate to encourage patent owners to seek (and complete) supplemental examination (and any resulting reexamination) regarding any potentially problematic information before filing suit. A patent challenger who wants to press an inequitable conduct defense, on the other hand, will have to assert that defense-in a declaratory judgment complaint, an answer to an infringement complaint, or a Paragraph IV letter-before the patentee initiates a supplemental examination.
172 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1).
The new § 257 took effect on September 16, 2012 and "appl[ies] to any patent issued before, on, or after that date."
173 Thus, patent owners can use supplemental examination to anticipatorily defeat potential inequitable conduct charges relating to any of their issued, pending, or future patents.
III. OPTIONS FOR PATENT OWNERS AFTER THERASENSE AND THE AIA
A patent owner considering enforcement, but concerned about or aware of a potential inequitable conduct issue, should consider the implications of Therasense and the AIA. Thanks to these and other recent developments, the menu of potential options for such a patent owner has changed. This section discusses the options, post-Therasense and the AIA, for patent owners faced with a potential inequitable conduct challenge.
A. Therasense's Impact on the Evidentiary Significance of Reexamination and Reissue
The first thing to consider is that as a result of Therasense, the evidentiary significance of reexamination and reissue has been altered. Prior to Therasense, a rejection of claims in reexamination or reissue over a previously undisclosed reference or references could serve as evidence of materiality. A claim rejection is an assertion by the USPTO that the reference(s) at issue prima facie anticipate or render obvious the claim(s) at issue. 174 A rejection thus represents the opinion of the USPTO-the expert agency-that more likely than not, the claims at issue are not patentable over the cited prior art. If the claims are (more likely than not) not patentable over a reference or references, then clearly a "'reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.'" 175 And before Therasense, materiality could be established by satisfying the "reasonable examiner" standard. In fact, before Therasense, even the grant of a request for reexamination with respect to a particular reference or references was potential evidence of materiality, 177 because the "substantial new question of patentability" standard the USPTO applies to determine whether to grant a request for reexamination is the "reasonable examiner" standard. 178 Furthermore, a USPTO determination that a substantial new question of patentability exists is a determination that the subject patent or printed publication is not cumulative. 179 Thus, a determination that a patent or publication raises a substantial new question of patentability is a USPTO determination that the patent or publication is material to the claim(s) at issue under the pre-Therasense standard. 180 Of course, a denial of a reexamination request in light of a particular reference was (and continues to be) evidence of non-materiality. 181 and then orders a reexamination, this will be taken as further evidence as to the materiality of the reference.
Id.
178 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2242 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) ("A prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable."). 179 See id. § 2216 (instructing examiners that to find a substantial new question of patentability, "[i]t must first be demonstrated that a patent or printed publication that is relied upon in a proposed rejection presents a new, non-cumulative technological teaching that was not previously considered and discussed on the record during the prosecution of the application that resulted in the patent for which reexamination is requested, and during the prosecution of any other prior proceeding involving the patent for which reexamination is requested"); id. § 2242 (explaining that a substantial new question of patentability does not exist "where the examiner finds the additional (newly provided) prior art patents or printed publications are merely cumulative to similar prior art already fully considered by the Office in a previous examination of the claim"). 180 with the pre-Therasense "reasonable examiner" materiality standard, made reexamination more useful as a tool for generating evidence of materiality, rather than establishing non-materiality.
The extent to which the courts would accept as evidence of materiality either a claim rejection or a grant of reexamination varied. 183 But certainly, where a patent owner acquiesced to a rejection by amending claims in response to a rejection over a previously undisclosed reference, it was difficult for the patentee to convincingly contend that the reference was not material to patentability.
184
The situation has significantly changed post-Therasense. Now, where the USPTO confirms or issues claims over the references or information in question (in reexamination or reissue), such confirmation refutes the notion that "but-for" the USPTO's inability to consider the reference, the claims in question would not have issued. That the reexamination request was granted in the first place, under the equivalent of the old "reasonable examiner" standard, is not enough to show materiality.
Accordingly, Therasense opens up a new frontier for a patent owner concerned about a potential inequitable conduct issue. If the previously undisclosed information is a patent or printed publication, the owner may be able to establish, by filing a request for reexamination and showing that its claims are patentable over the reference, that the reference is not "but-for" material. However, reexamination is not the only avenue. claims. 186 Thus the addition of a dependent claim or claims provides an avenue into reissue that can then be used to "vet" a previously undisclosed reference or references-via an information disclosure statement 187 -and obtain a USPTO determination that the reference does not anticipate or render obvious the claims of the patent and is, therefore, not "but-for" material. Furthermore, because the USPTO's consideration of issues in reissue is not limited to prior art issues (let alone printed prior art issues), 188 information disclosure statements in reissue can be used to bring to the attention information beyond that which can properly be considered in reexamination. Thus, one potential option for patentees faced with a possible inequitable conduct problem is to obviate that problem by establishing, via reexamination or reissue, the immateriality of the information at issue.
Furthermore, although the Federal Circuit has recently reminded us that inequitable conduct cannot be "cured" via reexamination or reissue, 189 deceptive intent on the part of the patentee is no longer an impediment to the use of reissue to obtain USPTO consideration of previously withheld or misrepresented information. The AIA changed the reissue statute so that it no longer limits the availability of reissue to the correction of errors that occurred "without any deceptive intention." 190 Thus, even where information was previously withheld undisclosed or misrepresented information, even after Therasense. This is certainly true pending further development of the law regarding materiality. First, certain categories of information are not properly considered in reexamination or reissue, and, therefore, supplemental examination (in which any information can be considered 195 ) may be the only viable route for consideration of such information. Furthermore, it is only by proceeding through supplemental examination that true immunity from litigating inequitable conduct can be obtained. 196 Because reexamination is limited to patents and printed publications, 197 if the information concerns pre-critical date activities, or a previously-submitted misleading declaration, for example, reexamination will not offer the opportunity to have the information considered or corrected. Reissue, as noted above, is now available to add dependent claims, 198 and there is no longer a requirement to allege that the reissue error was made "without any deceptive intention." 199 However, the patentee must consider whether submission via an information disclosure statement in reissue will fairly and adequately present or explain the information at issue. For example, depending on the circumstances, neither reissue nor reexamination may provide a suitable avenue for consideration and correction of a prior misleading declaration (whether or not related to patentability) or other potential "affirmative egregious misconduct" situations. 200 Paragraph IV letter before the patent owner initiates supplemental examination. 206 However, particularly if supplemental examination is the only route through which consideration of the particular information at issue can be obtained, 207 a patent owner who can use supplemental examination/ reexamination to generate evidence of immateriality may benefit from proceeding through supplemental examination even if the statutory immunity is no longer available.
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Applicable Standards and Procedures
A patent owner considering using a USPTO proceeding to preempt or blunt an anticipated inequitable conduct charge should note that a mere "substantial new question of patentability" will trigger reexamination 208 (including via supplemental examination), 209 whereas prima facie unpatentability is required for a rejection in reexamination. 210 Also, a patent owner who files a reissue application effectively re-opens prosecution, potentially inviting consideration of additional issues unrelated to the information it is trying to show is immaterial. 211 Cost and the anticipated length of the various alternative proceedings should also be considered. Supplemental examination is expensive, even if no reexamination is ordered. 212 On the other hand, the statute requires the USPTO to complete supplemental examination (and decide whether to order reexamination) within three months of the filing of the request. 213 Accordingly, a patent owner who has a high level of confidence that the USPTO will not find a substantial new question of patentability based on the information in question could make effective and efficient use of supplemental examination to preempt an inequitable conduct charge. On the other hand, if there is a reasonable possibility that the USPTO will find a substantial new question of patentability and order reexamination, the patent owner should consider whether they would prefer to proceed through reexamination, reissue or instead (where available), file a continuation application to have the information at issue considered.
